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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN G. WELLS, 
Plaintiff 
-vs-
and Appellant, ) 
CITY COURT OF LOGAN CITY, ) 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF ) 
UTAH, ) 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
Case No. 13824 
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF UTAH STATE ASSOCIATION OF 
CITY COURT JUDGES IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
* * * . . • . - . 
STATEMENT OF POSITION 
On May 1, 1975, this Court handed down its opinion 
in the above-entitled case, holding in effect that prosecutions 
for drunk driving under the Utah Motor Vehicle Code cannot 
take place in city courts if there is a justice of the peace 
nearer or more accessible to the place where the defendant is 
arrested (See Appendix "A" for the complete opinion of the 
Court). Respondent, Logan City, has filed a Petition for 
Rehearing which is the matter presently pending before the 
Court. 
The Utah State Association of City Court Judges is, 
as its name suggests, an organization consisting of the City 
Court Judges throughout the State of Utah, The members of 
the Association strongly feel that the Court's decision 
greatly undermines the city court system, that it is contrary 
to the best interests of the citizens of this state, and 
that the narrow construction given Section 41-6-166, Utah 
Code Annotated, is not required by the statute itself, nor 
was it construed in harmony with the intention of the legis-
lature. The City Judges appreciate the leave of court granted 
to them to be heard as friends of the Court, and as interested 
parties, and hopefully, we might be of assistance to the 
Court in pointing out circumstances and considerations which 
may have been overlooked. It will be respectfully urged 
that the Court reconsider its decision and grant respondent's 
Petition for a Rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CITY COURTS DO NOT 
HAVE COUNTY JURISDICTION IN ALL STATE TRAFFIC OFFENSES. 
A. Basic Policy Considerations. In considering 
the relationship of an individual member of society to its 
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government, it is difficult to conceive of anything more 
important than the judicial system. All of the basic rights 
guaranteed by law become meaningless if a tribunal is not 
available to dispense justice in an efficient, fair and im-
partial manner; and yet, because of human frailties, and in 
spite of all constitutional safeguards, no judicial system 
can ever be better than the judges behind it.. Recognizing 
this basic principle, it has always been the strong public 
policy of the State of Utah to require its judges to be 
trained in the law. Section 2, Article VIII of the Utah 
Constitution requires a Supreme Court Judge to be "an active 
member of the bar, in good standing, and learned in the law." 
The same requirement is imposed upon District Court Judges 
at Section 5, Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. And, 
likewise, City Court Judges are held to the same strict stan-
dards and qualifications at 78-4-4 and 78-4-8, Utah Code 
Annotated. Membership in the bar, of course, requires many 
years of legal education as well as good moral character and 
the successful passing of a difficult examination covering 
principles of common law, equity, criminal law and the statutes 
and practice of this state (78-51-10, Utah Code Annotated). 
The only judicial office to which the above qualifi-
cations do not apply is the justice of the peace. Obviously, 
the reason for this exception was simply the practicalities of 
-3-
the situation at statehood and the fact that even today there 
are many small communities throughout the state where legally 
trained people are simply not available. Certainly it is better 
to have good, fair-minded men dispensing justice than to have 
no judges at all. However, it is hardly debatable that effi-
cient judicial administration is best promoted by trained 
judges rather than untrained judges. 
The above policy considerations have been stressed 
because the effect of the Court's decision in this case is to 
take away the county-wide jursidiction of city courts in 
drunk driving and hit-run cases (which offenses are generally 
regarded as the most serious of all traffic offenses and 
involve the possible loss of driving privileges as well as 
fine and incarceration) and leave them with county-wide juris-
diction of all of the remaining minor traffic offenses. It 
is unreasonable to believe that the legislature could have 
intended to give the untrained judges the important cases 
and the trained judges the less important cases. Such result 
simply runs against the grain of all logic and common sense. 
In the case of Rowley -vs- Public Service Commission, 112 
Utah 116, 185 P.2d 514, this Court in stressing the importance 
of public policy in the interpretation of statutes stated 
as follows: 
"* * *Indeed, a purpose to disregard sound pub-
lic policy must not be attributed to the law-
making power, except upon the most cogent 
-4-
evidence, and it is the duty of the courts to 
render such an interpretation of the laws as 
will best promote the protection of the public, 
insofar as this may be accomplished in accor-
dance with well established rules of construc-
tion. * * * In some cases, the words of a 
statute may even be restrained or enlarged so 
as to comport with principles of sound public 
policy. * * *" 
The Court further stated that where "a literal interpretation 
of the language of the statute gives an absurd result" then 
the court will search further for the legislative intent, and 
had no trouble in rejecting the literal wording of the statute 
in depriving a motor carrier of the right to operate under a 
"grandfather" clause of the applicable statute. See also 
Johanson -vs- Cudahy Packing Company, 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 
98, holding that the literal wording of a statute need not 
be followed when to do so would defeat legislative intent 
and make the statute absurd. 
B. The Controlling Statutes. This brings us to the 
statute which the amicus curiae believes to be of controlling 
importance, namely Section 78-4-16.5 Utah Code Annotated, 
Pocket Supp., which provides as follows: 
"Whenever a complaint may be commenced 
before a magistrate under section 77-57-2, 
or an arrested person is to be taken before 
a magistrate under section 77-13-17, the 
complaint may be commenced or the arrested 
person may be taken before the nearest city 
court judge in counties where city courts 
have been established." 
The above statute was passed by the legislature in 1971 and 
-5-
is the most recent enactment of the statutes involved. The 
rational of the majority of the court in its opinion in 
this case was that the above statute is not applicable be-
cause it deals with arrests generally (covered by 77-13-17, 
Utah Code Annotated) and not specifically with arrests made 
under Section 41-6-166 of the Motor Vehicle Code (See Appendix 
"B" for full text of applicable statutes)* It is contended by 
the amicus curiae that such result is not required even by 
the literal wording of the statutes. 
Section 41-6-166, Utah Code Annotated, requires 
that a person arrested for drunk driving be taken to the 
nearest most accessible magistrate. Nothing whatever is stated 
in that section as to what the magistrate is to do when the 
arrested person is brought before him. Is he to be charged 
with an offense? Is he to simply be advised of his rights? 
Is he to be incarcerated? Is he to be given chemical tests? 
Is bond to be set? These questions are merely raised to 
show that Section 41-6-166 cannot be considered in isolation 
or in a vacuum. It most certainly must be considered in con-
nection with statutes for arrest generally and the general 
statutes relating to the procedures and jurisdiction of city 
courts and justice of the peace courts. For example, reference 
must be made to Section 77-13-17 dealing with arrests generally 
to indicate that when taken before a magistrate, a complaint 
stating the charge against the person arrested must be made. 
-6-
Since Section 77-13-17 and other procedural statutes apply to 
arrests for traffic as well as other offenses (otherwise 
Section 41-6-166 would be meaningless as no procedures would be 
established) the amending statute of 1971, Section 78-4-16.5 
would clearly have to apply. There is absolutely no rhyme or 
reason why the legislature would have intended otherwise. Nor 
is there anything irreconcilable in the applicable statutes. 
Additional rules of statutory construction supporting this 
conclusion are to the effect that related statutes should 
generally be harmonized with each other whenever possible, 
Glenn -vs- Farrell, 5 Utah 2d 439, 304 P.2d 380; also in the 
event of conflict, a later statute should prevail over an earlier 
statute, P.I.E. -vs- State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 
549. 
Another statute which has not been taken into considera-
tion is Section 41-6-169, Utah Code Annotated, which provides that 
the provisions and procedures of the Motor Vehicle Code relating 
to police officers making arrests without warrants "shall not 
otherwise be exclusive of any other method prescribed by law 
for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense of 
like grade". In light of the existence of this provision in 
the Motor Vehicle Code itself, it is not convincing that the 
legislature intended to exclude serious traffic offenses from 
the 1971 enactment (Section 78-4-16.5) giving city courts 
jurisdiction in all cases that otherwise might have been commenced 
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before a justice of the peace. 
It might also be noted that our sister state of 
California has recently held that the permitting of non-lawyer 
judges to preside over criminal trials for offenses involving 
jail sentences violates the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution. Gordon -vs- Justice Court for Yuba, J.D. 
of Sutter City, 558 P.2d 72. The California Supreme Court 
reasoned that a non-lawyer is simply not qualified to determine 
whether constitutional rights have been violated, to make rulings 
on technical questions of evidence, to properly voir dire wit-
nesses, to accept guilty pleas in accordance with constitutional 
requirements, and to make proper sentence decisions. The court 
very logically pointed out that if under the United States 
Constitution an accused is entitled to be represented by counsel 
in misdemeanor cases (Argersinger -vs- Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 
92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed.2d 530) it is even more important that 
the judge presiding at the trial be trained and competent. On 
the basis of Gordon, and the authority therein cited, a recent 
case was filed in the District Court of Salt Lake County 
challenging the constitutionality of the justice of the peace 
system in Utah as it applies to criminal trials (Shelmidine, et al. 
-vs- Jones, et al., Salt Lake County District Court No. 224948). 
On June 3, 1975, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. handed down a 
Memorandum Opinion holding that non-lawyer justices of the peace 
could not constitutionally impose jail sentences in criminal 
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trials (a copy of the full decision of the Court is attached 
hereto as Appendix UC!I). The decision in the Shelmidine -vs-
Jones case will undoubtedly soon be before this Court on appeal.* 
While it may be improper for the amicus curiae to get into the 
merits of that case, nevertheless it should be brought to the 
Court's attention as an additional reason for the propriety of 
granting a rehearing. Also, regardless of the final outcome of 
Shelmidine -vs- Jones, the reasoning therein and in the Gordon 
-vs- Justice Court for Yuba, supra, is very persuasive as a 
simple guide toward finding the reasonable legislative intents 
Aside from the fact that statutes are not to be construed in a 
manner that makes their constitutionality questionable, it is 
simply incredible that the legislative intent of a statute 
passed in 1971 could be construed in such a manner as to 
restrict the jurisdiction of legally trained judges who conduct 
their proceedings in dignified surroundings, and expand the 
jurisdiction of the laymen judges, many of whom don't even have 
courtrooms. 
C. Other Practical Considerations. There are still 
other practical considerations which the Court may have over-
looked. For example, in Davis County, Utah, there are numerous 
towns and cities each having a justice of the peace, as well as 
various interspersed and irregular county areas served by a 
precinct justice of the peace. It is not uncommon for individual 
justices of the peace to hold court at different places, such as 
- 9 - • ; • 
at home, or at his place of business, or at the town hall, 
whichever is most convenient. Under these circumstances, it 
creates a nightmare for an arresting officer making an arrest 
someplace on a freeway to determine which is the nearest most 
accessible magistrate. Must each highway patrol officer keep 
daily track of a dozen or more justices of the peace? Likewise, 
it places an unreasonable and unintended burden on prosecutors 
in having to establish this as an element of their case. Does 
this now become a jury question? And is the state required now * 
to expand its prosecutors so as to try more and more cases in 
justice courts, many of which are held only at night since the 
justice of the peace may have a daytime job? These are undoubt-
edly some of the considerations which motivated the legislature 
in giving county-wide jurisdiction to city courts. Courts are 
to avoid a construction of a statute that will result in con-
fusion or uncertainty. Masich -vs- United States Smelting, 
Refining & Mining Company, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612. 
CONCLUSION 
This case is of extreme importance because it reflects 
upon the entire judiciary. It has been said that 90% of the 
citizens of our state will never appear in a district court. 
The vast majority of persons having contact with the law will 
do so in connection with a traffic ticket or a related type of 
matter. The impressions made on the city court level will 
- 1 0 - •;••.'••' 
largely determine the respect, or lack of respect, that the 
community as a whole develops toward all courts and toward the 
rule of law that we hold so sacred. The importance of developing 
respect for the courts and of administering justice in dignified 
surroundings by competent, well-trained judges is so overwhelming 
that it is inconceivable to reasonably ascribe a conflicting 
legislative intent. It should be the policy of this court to 
upgrade the judicial administration throughout the State of Utah 
wherever possible. The decision in Wells -vs- Logan City Court 
as it presently stands would be a step backward in accomplishing 
this objective. The decision is simply not in the best interests 
of the citizens of this state. It is contrary to the long 
established public policy of this state. It is contrary to any 
manifestation of legislative intent, and it is contrary to the 
statutes themselves. The amicus curiae respectfully urges the 
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Since the time of typing the other portions of this 
brief, it has been brought to the attention of the amicus 
curiae that another petition has been filed in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County seeking to prohibit the Murray City 
Court from proceeding with a drunk driving case. The reason-
ing of the petition is that since under Shelmidine -vs- Jones, 
justices of the peace can no longer impose jail sentences, 
and since under Wells -vs- Logan City a defendant must be 
taken before a justice of the peace if he is the nearest and 
most accessible, then the punishment for the offense will 
depend upon where it took place creating an unconstitutional 
discrimination. If the decision in Wells -vs- Logan City 
continues to stand, we may no longer have the offense of drunk 
driving in the State of Utah. 
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APPENDIX "A" 
John G. Wells , 
Plaintiff and Appellant, No. 13824 
v . F I L E D 
May 1, 1975 
City Court of Logan City, County 
of Cache, State of Utah, _ _ 
Defendant and Respondent, Allan E. Mecham, Clerk 
HENRIOD, Chief Just ice: 
Appeal from a denial of a petition to prohibit the Logan City Court from 
pursuing a prosecut ion on a drunk driving complaint because it had no j u r i s -
diction under the facts and statutes of this state. Reversed , with instructions 
to grant the petition and i s sue the writ . 
Wells was arres ted nine mi l e s from Logan, Cache County, Utah, but 
only one mi le from Wel lsv i l le , Cache County, Utah. Both c i t i e s , or towns, 
have mag i s t ra te s . * He was taken under obvious arrest to Logan, and t i cke t -
booked in the Logan City Court, which ticket printedly and presumably order* 
ed him to appear at a date certain to answer, to which ticket he did not con-
sent or s ign, although he may have had that opportunity. 
His attorney appeared special ly and filed a motion to d i s m i s s a c o m -
plaint based on these facts , on statutory grounds, 2 which was denied. The 
motion was based on a failure of the arrest ing officer to comply with a very 
s imple statute which says in c lear English that if a person is arres ted for 
drunk driving by a peace officer, or anyone e l s e , "he shall be immediate ly 
taken to a magis trate . . . who has jurisdiction of such offense and i s neares t 
. . . to the place where such arres t i s made ." Wellsvi l le had such a m a g i s -
trate, or just ice of the peace at the t ime of this arres t . 
There i s no showing here that the Wellsvi l le magistrate had gone 
fishing, and it should be mandated that peace off icers , in light of exist ing 
statutes , should not be free to go fishing for magistrates * which eas i ly 
could lead to inequity and/or injustice, although there is no such suggest ion 
in this c a s e .
 % 
It i s important to note the complaint filed against Wells was laid under 
Tit le 41 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, - the Motor Vehicle Code, - not under 
Title 77 , having to do generally with magistrate procedural and jurisdict ional 
matters re misdemeanors as offenses , - of which there are hundreds and 
probably thousands that this wri ter intends not to count. But under Ti t le 41
 f 
there are carved out, in 4 1 - 6 - 1 6 6 , two specific misdemeanors , i . e. , - 1) 
driving under the influence, and 2) leaving the scene of an accident, in which 
events defined with so lemn specif icity, in as ceremonious , c l ear , convincing, 
language imaginable, requires that the person arrested for either of such 
c lear ly defined misdemeanors "shall be immediately taken before a m a g i s -
trate . . . nearest or more access ib le" to "the place where said a r r e s t is 
imade . . . . " It i s not the defendant's duty to prove but only to c l a i m that 
this v/as not done, s ince it is the state's duty to prove beyound a reasonable 
doubt that it followed statutory interdictions, - not the defendant's duty to 
expend t ime , money or irritation to prove that the state, of all m o n s t e r s , 
did not conce ive , nurture, and feed its own offspring. 
1. Weils vil le was one of such. 
2. Tit le 41 -6 -166 , Utah Code Annotated 1953. • 
3. Tit les 7 7 - 1 0 - 4 , 5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 7 8 - 5 - 5 , U. C.A. 1953. 
4. Not "may" be , or in the "discret ion of someone ," etc . 
The state1 s attempt to talk about Title 77 is a diversionary tactic, and 
its refusal to talk about Title 41-6-166, is an evasive action that runs pro-
cedure and emotion into a questionable judicial cul du sac. 
WE CONCUR: 
R. L. Tuckett, Justice 
Richard J. Maughan, Justice 
ELLETT, Justice: (Dissenting) 
I dissent. Logan City Court is presided over by a lawyer-judge and has 
jurisdiction throughout Cache County. The Wellsville justice of the peace is a 
non-lawyer. He likewise has county-wide jurisdiction of misdemeanors. There 
is nothing in the record to show where the justice of the peace was at the time of 
the arrest or whether he was "available*1 at that time. 
The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was not taken before the 
nearest and most accessible magistrate when he was arrested. It would appear 
that he would be required to prove that allegation as a part of his case. By 
failing to do so, he was not entitled to prevail in his suit, and the lower court 
was correct in so ruling. 
The City Court of Logan has jurisdiction of the offense of drunk driving, 
and the idea that Mr. Wells should have been taken elsewhere is no defense to 
this action. Mr. Wells was taken to Logan in order that a breathalyzer test 
could be made pursuant to Section 41-6-44. 10, U. C. A. 1953 (Replacement 
Volume 5A), since that is the only place in Cache County where the test could 
be conducted. He accompanied the officer there and after taking the test was 
released. He was not taken before a magistrate in Logan City or anywhere else* 
The prosecution was initiated against Mr. Wells at a later date by the 
filing of a complaint and the service of a summons upon him pursuant to 
Section 77-12-21, U. C. A. 1 9 5 3 . ' 
The venue of criminal actions is set out in Section 76-1-202, U. C. A. 
1953 (1973 Pocket Supplement). That section sets forth a number of situations 
not material here and then in (g) (v) it provides: 
For any other offense, tTial may be held in the county in 
which the defendant resides, or, if he has no fixed residence, 
in the county in which he is apprehended or to which he is 
extradited. 
It thus appears that Mr. Wells can be tried in any court in Cache County 
which has jurisdiction therein, and the misdemeanor charge in the Logan City 
Court is properly placed, and the trial thereof should not be interfered with by 
this court. 
In addition to what is said above, this prosecution is proper in view of 
the fact that a new section was added to our statute by Chapter 7, Section 3, 
Laws of Utah 1971, which reads as follows: 
Whenever a complaint may be commenced before a magis-
trate under section 77-57-2, or an arrested person is to be taken 
before a magistrate under section 77-13-17, the complaint may 
be commenced or the arrested person may be taken before the 
nearest city court judge in counties where city courts have been 
established. 
A££end^LJ^l-^ntinHed 
. C. A. 1953 as amended (1973 Pocket 
v-r A X . . V 
The statute thus gives the officer the discretion and the right to take 
a prisoner to or file a complaint in the nearest city court having jurisdiction 
of the offense. The defendant herein was the only city court in the county. 
The other magistrates were mere town just ices . 
The ruling of the tr ia l court in my opinion was correc t and should 
be affirmed* 
Crockett, Just ice , concurs in the views expressed in the dissent ing opinion 
of Mr, Just ice Ellett . 
APPENDIX "B" 
TEXT OF STATUTES 
41-6-166: Appearance Upon Arrest for Misdemeanor 
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of 
this act punishable as a misdemeanor, the arrested person 
shall be immediately taken before a magistrate within the 
county in which the offense charged is alleged to have 
been committed and who has jurisdiction of such offense 
and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the 
place where said arrest is made, in any of the following 
cases: 
(1) When a person arrested demands an immediate l 
appearance before a magistrate. 
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge of 
driving while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor or narcotic drugs. 
(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of 
failure to stop in the event of an accident 
causing death, personal injuries, or damage 
to property. 
(4) In any other event when the person arrested 
refuses to give his written promise to appear 
in court as hereinafter provided, or when in 
the discretion of the arresting officer, a 
written promise to appear is insufficient. 
77-13-17: Duty of Arresting Officers Without Warrant—Delivery 
of Prisoner—Complaint—Duty of Magistrate 
When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace offi-
cer or private person, the person arrested must, without unneces-
sary delay, be taken to the nearest or most accessible magis-
trate in the county in which the arrest is made, and a com-
plaint, stating the charge against the person must be made * 
before such magistrate. A conductor or other person who 
makes an arrest as provided in Section 77-13-5 shall, with-
out unnecessary delay, take the person so arrested before 
any accessible magistrate or deliver him to a peace officer? 
and a complaint stating the charge against the person must 
Appendix "B" Continued 
be made. The magistrate before whom such charge is made, 
if the offense is triable by him, shall have full jurisdic-
tion over the offense and the defendant to try and determine 
such offense. If he has not jurisdiction to try the defen-
dant for the offense charged, he must proceed as provided in 
chapter 15 of this title. 
APPENDIX "C" 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAIl 
LARRY J. SliELMIDINL and JOHN F. 
REEVES, on their own behalf and 
on behalf of all others similarly 
situated in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, 
Plaintiffs, 
CliARLENE POLLY COOK, 
Intervening Plainti: 
vs. 
CHARLES A. JONES in his capacity 
as Justice of the P^ace of 
Precinct 4 of Salt Lake County, 
Utah; LYUW D. BERNARD, RALPH 
GUILDS, LYLE GUNDERSOM , WAYNE 
GUNDERSON, GERALDINL CIIRISTENSKN , 
HENRY U. PRICE, WARREN D. COLE, 
REX C. CONRADSON, LLMAR L. 
JOHNSON, all in their capacity as 
Justices of the Peace, for 




Case No. 224943 
Plaintiffs challenge the practice of per-
mitting non-lawyer justices of the peace to hear misdemeanor 
cases in 'v/hich a jail sentence could be imposed. This 
challenge in founded upon three bases: That Due Process 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution requires that judges in criminal cases 
in v/hich imprisonment may be imposed be lawyers; that the 
practice of permitting most'of the justices of the peace 
1
 C'-jcticn 7ft-f>-". , !it:ah Ccd^ 'Annotated, provides that: 
"Ju-trees' courts have jurisdiction oz the 
t^ llov/ing public offenses committed v/ithin the respec-
' -• * — " M * - i ,.<-.
 Ir» v/hich such courts are established: 
tmroucj.iuuL. ui'j out.iv--. ^^  *^w a.^  — j 
time requiring there judges of the city courts, whose juris-
diction is the same as the justice courts with regard to 
this type of offense, be lawyers, constitutes a denial of 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States; that the right to counsel 
and, more fundamentally, the right to a fair trial, mandated. 
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the.Federal 
Constitution are abridged and denied by allowing non-lawyer 
or lay judges to preside in any criminal case in which a 
jail sentence may be imposed. 
By virtue of the foregoing assertions, 
plaintiffs are asking this Court to prohibit the defendants, 
of the peace, 
in which each 
plaintiff is chargeu with the commission of a misdemeanor 
offense, the conviction of v/hich could result in imprison-
racnt/ Both plaintiffs and defendants have moved for 
summary judgment and, to that end, have stipulated that 
}
 discharge of his duties or to have been 
committed with such intent as to render 
the act a felony. - , 
(3) Breaches of the peace, committing a wilful 
injury to property, and all misdemeanors 
punishable by a fine less than $300 or by 
imprisonment in the county jail or municipal 
prison not exceeding six months or by both 
such fine and imprisonment." 
Section 76-3-7*01 provides that a fine of $299 may be 
imposed upon a conviction of a Class ii or C misde-
meanor or infraction. Section 7G-3-2CM provides that 
the sentence '"or a Class 1' misdemeanor may be for a 
term of imprisonment not exceeding
 %six months and 
for a Class C misdemeanor tor a term^not exceeding 
90 dayr.. Unci^ r Section 70-3-205, no person convicted 
of an infraction may be imprisoned.' 
Piaintiffs Sh^imicine and Reeves are charqec with the 
,—: r-.-. of r-rivrae under the influence of intoxicating 
each of whom is a ncn-lawyer or lay justice 
from hearing cases involving the plaintiffs 
facts are more fully set out in the memoranda filed by the 
respective parties v;ith two minor exceptions noted in the 
record during oral argument, about which there is likewise 
no dispute which raises any issue of fact. 
Justice of the peace courts in Utah, manned 
by non-lawyer judqes, are courts of convenience, particularly 
in isolated rural areas typical of most of this state in 
which there are few, and sometimes no attorneys. In the 
early days of statehood there were so few attorneys and such 
qreat distances to be covered by those attorneys v/ho v/ere 
available that the system of justice in dealing with minor 
criminal offenses would have broken down corapletelv if 
lawyer judges had been required. Thus, while city court, 
district court and Supreme Court judges were, from the 
inception of statehood and before, required to be lawyers, 
both wive Constitution of the state of Utah and legislative 
enactment left open'the question of qualifications of the 
judges of justice courts with respect to legal background 
anc* ci~ a.*.miic[« 
Modern transportation and communication 
have considerably alleviated much of the probl-era earlier 
encountered in effectuating a viable means of administer-
ing effective and speedy justice on the misdemeanor level* 
nevertheless, of the 29 counties in Utah there are still 
eight counties with two o'r less resident attorneys and 
five e'euntics with no resident attorney, for lawyers, whose 
l.ive bincoc: i': dependent upon the service:;" they arc able to 
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legal counsel. The impact of this on the administration of . 
misdemeanor offenses -- the very type of offense v/ith which 
a limited-jurisdiction, lay justice of the peace most fre-
quently deals -- is immediately apparent: ..One-third of the 
counties of the state do not have enough resident lawyers 
to staff the justice courts and still have a prosecutor and 
defense counsel. In Salt Lake County, where the heaviest 
concentration of lawyers is found, only one justice court 
judge is a lawyer. 
Kith this background, the question before 
this Court is whether the historically convenient and 
necessary lay justice of the peace system in Utah can 
withstand the developing mandates of Due Process, of funda-
mental fairness and of equal protection. The basic predicate 
is not whether a lay justice of the peace can conduct an 
error-free trial or whether he is capable of being fair and 
impartial, for Due Process does not guarantee an error-free 
trial, Koberts vs. New York City 295 U.S. 264 S.Ct., 
L.Ed. 2d (1934) , nor does this Court have any doubt 
that for the most part lay justices of the peace are fully 
capable of fairness and.impartiality. Rather, it is whether 
a non-lawyer judge has sufficient legal training, background 
and experience to afford a misdemeanant a fair trial, the 
end result of which may-be imprisonment. In this context, 
1
 fairi.e:,:;" (iocs not mean merely impartiality. Its meaning 
is of constitutional necessity more encompassing. It alludes 
to a quality.of. justice which fully observes all rights, 
both • substantive 'and procedural, of the citizen-defendant 
inwhich he lives, no matter how petty. Ideally, one.would 
hope for an entire judiciary staffed with learned judges 
who, by intellect and passion, are able to discern the 
delicate and subtle nuances extant in our constitutional 
system by which the rights of the individual are balanced 
against the power oi: the government. While the ideal may 
not be perfectly mot, we come as close as humanly possible 
by imposing rigorous standards of training, background, 
experience and temperament on our judges to achieve the 
highest quality of justice possible. To impose less than 
that does not meet the fundamental constitutional require-
ments of Due Process for a constitutionally fair trial 
where loss of liberty is a possible consequence. Due 
Process permits no compromise between fundamental rights 
en the one hand and convenience or necessity on the other. 
If one is entitled, under the growing 
concepts of Due Process and fair trial, to legal counsel 
in a misdemeanor case where there is a possibility of 
imprisonment, Argersinger vs. Hamlin, 4 07 U.S. 25, 9 2 S.Ct. 
1006, 32 L.Ed. 2d 530 (1972), see also Gideon vs. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 33 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed. 2d 799.(15T>3), then 
",ue Process, the right to a fair trial and the right to 
counsel likewise mandate that under such circumstances only 
w lawyer-judge, qualified by training, background and 
•experience to comprehend and utilize counsel's legal argu-
::-.-n'LG, can impose a sentence of imprisonment:, Gordon vr:. 
::
_r::L:L^? .f^-J-' n : > Cl1- Kptr. G22, 12 Cni . 3d 323, 
5j3 P.!.; 7 2 '19 7 4), *:crt. cen. 16 Cr.L. 14 83, 1484 (1975).' 
Trie e-.:fendants nevertheless argue that the 
of an appeal "anew" to a .lawyer judge, and thus saves the 
system from any constitutional infirmity. But must a 
defendant incur the added expense, both in time and money, 
of an appeal in order to be afforded Due Process? I think 
net. The availability of a trial <^e_ novo on appeal docs 
not guarantee a fair trial in. the justice court, the court 
with which we are here dealing. Plaintiffs are entitled to 
Due Process and a fair trial in the first instance. Ward 
vs. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. BO, 
34 L.Ed. 2d 267 (1972). 
This Court therefore finds and holds that 
the practice under Utah law which allows non-lawyer or 
lay justices of the peace to impose a jail sentence or 
imprisonment constitutes a denial of a criminal defendant's 
right to a fair trial in violation of the mandate of the 
Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States. To the extent that Section 78-5-4, 
Utah Code Annotated, authorizes lay justices of the peace 
to impose imprisonment, it, too, is violative of the 
guarantees under the Federal Constitution of Due Process, 
of the right to fair trial and of the right to^counsel, 
and is void."-' .' 
Accordingly*,' defendants1 motion for summary 
judgment is denied, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
.1 . 
is partially4 granted, and the defendants are prohibited 
It is unnecessary lo address the que.::;Lion of whether 
a U\y judge can impose a fine since tj\e only matter 
presently before this Court is whethcor a lay judge 
r.c.n afLect the "liberty" of "a defendant bv imprison-
•'•••'. It is granted "partially" because, while the plaintiffs 
l
-- • — — * s •; - rv^ nrt- prohibit tne defendants from 
i V V ^ O -*- . as J.ay juuqer. irom .. 
u::on a conviction of the offenses over which they otherv/ise 
have jurisdiction. Counsel for the plaintiffs are directed 
to prepare and submit an Extraordinary Writ in the nature 
cf prohibition in accordance with this memorandum decision. 
Dated this 3rd day of June, 1975. 






Stcw-art M. Hanson, J r , 
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